C ontext and A im
The study of language is guided by a number of fundamental questions, among them the following; 1 a What constitutes knowledge of a language? b How does such knowledge develop? c How is such knowledge put to use? I will be concerned here with certain aspects of the first and second of these problems (Chomsky 1981,32 ).
It has always been Chomsky's ultimate aim to answer lb, and it has always been Chomsky's belief that an answer to lb presupposes an answer to la that can be given in terms of an independent, autonomous description of language structure. It is my ultimate aim to answer that part of Ic which is concerned with how we understand language, and it is my belief that the purpose of any investigation determines the format, methods, and principles to be adopted. It is, furthermore, my claim (cf. Thrane 1992a,b; 1993, fc) that computational linguistics in general has accepted Chomsky's belief, no matter what its purpose has been -and that this has prevented serious progress in the study of computational understanding of NL. Chomsky's belief is the foundation of what might be called the descriptive paradigm in linguistics -cf. Chomsky (1981,33) : [W] e can say that a grammar constructed by a linguist is 'descriptively adequate' if it gives a correct account of the system of rules that is mentally represented, that is, if it correctly characterizes the rules and representations of the internally-represented grammar.
What I shall be specifically concerned with here is a central feature of that paradigm, the relationship between constituency rules and semantic interpretation. And although various forms of semantic motivation play a role in the choice of such rules, my conclusion will be that it is the wrong kind of semantic motivation when the purpose of the investigation is language understanding rather than language description.
P S -ru les and con straints
There are two interpretations of any system of PS-rules: 2 a as an autonomous formalization of the knowledge of syntactic structure b as a set of instructions for tree-building There are at least four types of constraint on PS-rules:
3 a assumptions about the nature of PS-rules d motivations for the choice of PS-rules Only 3d is my concern here, so I'll be a bit more specific about these. Two kinds of motivations for rule systems can be identified: Data-oriented 4 a A rule system is chosen because it reveals structural dif ferences between sentences SI and S2 that correlate with per ceived differences of meaning between SI and S2.
278 b A rule system is chosen because it reveals structural properties of a sentence S that will play a role in determining the meaning of S. Theory-oriented c A rule system R is preferred over another R' because R is more constrained, consistent, and/or general than R'. Only the data-oriented motivations are my concern here. To keep the presentation at a manageable level, I shall confine myself to a discussion of PS-rules for the analysis of NP. (5) gives some data that should be handled by such rules. Even though the data are Danish and the rule systems to be discussed are for English, this shouldn't affect the general points being made. 5 a alle de mange andre drenge all the many other boys b de mange andre drenge c mange andre drenge d andre drenge e *alle mange andre drenge f alle andre drenge g alle drenge h drenge The four rule systems to be mentioned are rivals within the Chomskytradition, to some extent reflecting its historical development. They are all post X-bar and therefore couched in X-bar terminology, even though one of them is not explicitly presented in such terms by its authors. They all assume a transformational component. I explicitly mention only those constraints that are unique to the rulesystem in question. All of them share such X-bar defining constraints as • Designated Head • Introduction of at most one lexical item per rule • A lexical item introduced by a rule is the Head of the Phrase under analysis • Allowance for cross-generalization 279 F ou r p roposed rule system s System 1 (Jackendoff 1977 
• Requires a representational (semantic) level of Logical Form Problems • Undergeneration: will not generate any of 5. If we look at these four rule systems under interpretation 2a, they are clearly designed to answer questions la or b. Jackendoffs and Stuurman's rules are meant to provide partial answers to la, while Wexler & Culicover's and Haegeman's are designed to answer lb. The members of each pair then differ among themselves. Jackendoffs and Wexler & Culicover's rules are data-oriented, whereas Stuurman's and Haegemann's are theory-oriented. There is nothing to choose between them, however, as far as the understanding vs. description dichotomy goes. They are all descriptive.
C om putable R ep resentations
Under interpretation 2b of a rule-system and its associated constraints, a parser is an implementation of a computational process which feeds on information provided by grammar rules and constraints, and then con verts one representation -in the form of a NL sentence -into another representation -in the form of a tree. In this sense, trees are computable representations. The following are samples of trees computed from the rule systems and constraints we have been looking at. There is a perceived difference of meaning between 6a and b, which is the same in English as in Danish. None of the rule systems we've looked at would be prepared to propose different syntactic structures for 6a and b. So, a perceived difference in meaning is in itself neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for proposing different syntactic structures. Nevertheless, this seems to be precisely what we need to account for language understanding: to be able to say that perceived differences in grammatical meaning correlate with differences in computable represen tations -only that these representations are of a different sort from the tree-structures that we have been concerned with so far. The difference can be explained with reference to the illustration of the relations between language, 'mind' and reality in Figure 1 : There are apparently three computable representations in this diagram:
• the tree is a representation of the syntactic structure of the sentence it's a box -assumed to be created on the basis of syntactic knowledge • the house is a representation of a real house -assumed to be created on the basis of information provided by visual perception These two are similar in being representations of the phenomena that gave rise to them. They are, in my terms, created on the basis of descrip tive information, and they have inclination of fit towards a target which is identical to their source. They are source-inclined.
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FIG 1 ; The effect of descriptive and interpretive information, and Inclination of Fit
What is the box a representation of? It is standardly argued, I think, that the box is a representation of the meaning of the sentence it's a box. This argument is based on the assumption that lexical items and sentences contain meaning, and that this meaning can be independently represented. However, nothing so far has proved this assumption either useful or necessary for the purposes of language understanding. It is a purely descriptive view. For the purpose of language understanding it is much more fruitful to adopt the view that linguistic items have semantic effects. And that semantic effects have consequences for the creation and manipu lation of computable structures. So, • the box is not a representation of anything, but rather a computable structure with representational potential, created on the basis of infor mation made explicit by the meaning of the sentence it's a box. It is different from the other two in not being a representation of its source. It is similar to the others in being a structure with inclination of fit. I call it target-inclined, for it has inclination of fit towards a target which is different from its source. If it has a target, then it becomes a representation. It is created on the basis of interpretive information. In general, the information that language carries in virtue of meaning is interpretive.
S em antic effect
So, for the purposes of language understanding, linguistic items do not contain meaning, they have semantic effects. Replacing the notion of semantic content by the notion of semantic effect need not force us to abandon the key principle of (formal) semantics, the principle of compositionality. We can reformulate it as the Principle of uniformity of semantic effect Whatever semantic effect an expression has in one composite expres sion, it has the same semantic effect in another composite expression. Pursuit of this principle has some interesting consequences. Firstly, the explanation of specificness and genericness in English, for example, cannot be upheld in its usual form, which in fact assigns two different semantic effects to the articles. Secondly, lexical (or descriptive) meaning is not subject to the principle. The assignment of a certain semantic effect to bank, for example, concerns its status as a noun or a verb, not its status as a homonym. The property of having a certain semantic effect is a matter of grammatical, or structural, meaning. It thus makes sense to inquire into, for example, the semantic effects of NP as a structural entity.
Sem antic effects o f NP
NP contains information that enables us to
individuate entities enumerate entities classify entities assign properties to entities compare entities identify entities semantic effect of D semantic effect of Q semantic effect of N semantic effect of A semantic effect of A semantic effect of NP In accord with Devlin (1991,20f; 25) , individuation presupposes a basic cognitive capacity to discriminate. Enumeration is a matter of recursive individuation. Classification is a function of individuation and our general cognitive capacity to categorize entities -ie. to realize that two distinct entities may be the 'same' in some respect. Property assignment is a function of individuation and our general cognitive capacity to localize entities -ie. to realize that the same entity may be in different places at different times. Subclassification and comparison are matters of recursive classification and property assignment, respectively. Finally, identification is a function of either classification or property assignment or both. Figure 2 illustrates these principles.
This kind of semantic motivation is utterly deplorable for descriptive purposes. Yet for functional purposes it has two advantages:
• we can give a principled subclassification of (Danish) specifiers • we can give a general layout of the organization of Danish NP in which the question of hierarchical structure is relegated to secondary impor tance -perhaps to be accounted for by lexical dependency rules -in deference to the question of linear order, which is far more important for language understanding. Notice that some of the otherwise distinct effects are neutralized in some cases. The interrogatives and distributives (hv-) neutralize the quantifierdeterminer effect. They are just exhaustive, in the sense of instructing the listener to take everything in the universe of discourse which meets the conditions posed by whatever lexical material follows in the NP into account.
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C on clu sion
I was asked after delivering the present paper what it had to do with computational linguistics. Granted, if the term 'computational linguistics' is reserved for the automatic manipulation of strings in various waysnot a lot. But if it is taken as a term for those varied branches of study that converge on the common goal of "produc[ing] a comprehensive, computational theory of language understanding and production that is well-defined and linguistically motivated" (Allen 1987 ,2), then -quite a lot. Among the consequences for computational linguistics of the position defended above the following are of especial interest;
• Rethinking of the nature of 'rules'. PS-rules may be an efficient and elegant means of capturing the structural properties of sentences. Yet if what we are interested in is not primarily structural properties, but the effect of structural information on computable structures, then they may not be efficient. Perhaps production rules, embellished with instructions for actions, would be a better choice. Cf. Thrane (fc) and Dinsmore (1991) .
• Rejection of correspondence theory as the basis of semantics. Whether a sentence is true or not is a question of whether the computable structure it gives rise to has inclination of fit towards a factual situation or not. This question is clearly of secondary importance to the primary question of how computable structures are created and maintained in the first place. If the information needed for these procedures emerges from various aspects of NL meaning, then equally clearly these aspects of meaning must take analytic precedence over other semantic matters. • • Parsing vs. model construction. Parsing as currently practised is an inherently descriptive endeavour. The product of a successful parse is a set of source-inclined trees that reveal structural properties of NL sentences. However, parsing is a complex procedure which subsumes recognition of input and production of output, and there is nothing to prevent us from writing a parser that will yield a different, targetinclined kind of output structure. Nothing, that is, except the problems of identifying and formalizing the features that constitute the 'situatedness' of natural language. This would entail, among other things, taking a procedural view of the meaning of specifiers, instead of just recording it and using it for grammaticality checks, as is usually done. Consider in this connection the following remark by Bolter (1984, 125) 
[my italics]:
When humans speak to their robots or electronic brains, they do so in something approximating English, often omitting articles and other small words to suggest the computer's preference for reducing language to the bare bones of logic.
This is just utter nonsense in the present context. The implicit belief that 'the bare bones of logic' are embedded in lexical meaning has nothing to recommend it, even under standard assumptions about quantification in natural language and logic. Under present assumptions, withholding from 'our robots and electronic brains' the information provided by 'articles and other small words' is tantamount to preventing them from even beginning to understand what we are talking to them about.
